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Creating an Honors
Community:
A Virtue Ethics Approach
NANCY A. STANLICK
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

INTRODUCTION

T

o become an honors student (that is, to be accepted into an honors college or program) requires satisfying specific entrance requirements, most or all of which are
directly related to a student’s grade point average and potential for success in a rigorous academic environment. To gain entrance into and be present in an organization or
community are not sufficient, however, to characterize a person as a complete member of it. There is more to community membership than simple presence. To be a
member of a community is also to perform actions and develop or possess traits of
character consistent with those actions. In a community of honors students, membership requires that one be or become a person worthy of honor.
“Honor” is an active moral notion, understood not only as that which someone
receives (i.e., to be honored) but also that which a person warrants (i.e., to be worthy
of honor). To be honored is one thing; to be worthy of honor is another. To examine
and explain the concept of honor in its virtue-theoretic sense in the context of an honors college requires understanding the unique position of the honors student, her
responsibilities as a member of an honors organization, and the implications of her
position and responsibilities in the creation and sustenance of an honors community.
What I wish to discuss in this paper are the importance and implication of the
notion of “community” as it affects, is affected, and is effected by a student’s membership in an honors college/community. To this end, I will concentrate on the meaning of honor, the distinction between gaining acceptance into a community and
becoming (and being) a member of it, and the way in which a student’s conception of
her place in an honors community entails benefits and obligations that are central to
the creation and sustenance of the community. I explain this using the honor code
from the University of Central Florida Burnett Honors College to distinguish between
individualism and communitarianism, which are in turn related to individual and community ascendancy models of social relations. I will show the ways in which honors
colleges and their students are central players in the creation of academic communities of personal and intellectual excellence. That is, I will show that honors students
are academic and moral exemplars.
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HONOR, DISHONOR, FRIENDSHIP, AND THE
HONORS COMMUNITY
The term “honor” may indicate high status (e.g., “honors student”), in which case
the word “honor” serves to describe the person to which it is applied. It also functions
as a verb when it is used to express something being done (e.g., “I honor my father”).
Further, however, “honor” is a moral term, indicating approval and exhortation to be
a person of honor. In its moral sense, then, “honor” can be a descriptive term signifying a person’s perceived status or the character of a behavior, as would be the case in
“She is an honors student” or “She is a person of honor.” But one can go further with
the moral notion of honor and see that it is also a morally laudatory term. When one
is called an “honors student” or “a person of honor,” the speaker is not only describing the status of one possessed of honor but is at the same time indicating that it is
good to be an honors student or a person of honor.
I suspect that, in ordinary speech, one rarely hears a tone of disapproval when a
person’s actions or character are said to be worthy of honor. To claim that someone’s
action is honorable is to say that the action should be held in high esteem and be
respected. It would be peculiar to claim that a person who praises the honorable person or action does not at the same time prescribe that trait of character or that action
for himself and others. So when “honor” is used to elaborate on what it is to be a person of honor, “honor” is a term of moral approbation. To be dishonorable, then, or to
perform actions that are dishonorable, is a matter of moral disapproval.
Also in ordinary conversation, the term “honors student” conjures up in the imagination a high academic achiever but not necessarily a moral exemplar. But this is, I
think, where the notion of honor implies something about the nature of those who are
honored for their attainments or traits of character and about the relationship of honor
and honoring to the creation, maintenance, and character of community. Because
honor is negatively associated with shame, “the fear of being shamed leads to a strong
sense of honor. Honor, then, is more associated with a group or community, an attempt
to achieve a certain recognition from others” (Liszka, 44).
Honor connotes respect and admiration from others who understand the behavior
of a person who is “honored” to have done something, or who is the sort of person,
that other members of the group or community ought to do or be. If we understand the
term only as descriptive or designative of a position, the term “honor” may lose its
more complete moral meaning and importance in the same way that other terms have
incomplete meanings when used only as descriptors of the appearances of things.
Consider the incomplete meaning of honor when it refers only to a person’s placement
in an organization by comparing it with a person’s status as a citizen in a political
community.
Being present in an organization or community is not sufficient for complete
membership in it; thus, for instance, a person visiting a nation of which she is not a
citizen is present in a political group without being a member of it. The visitor may
wish to be a citizen, pretend to be one, apply to become a citizen, and, prior to
obtaining citizenship status, perform at least some actions that are consistent with
citizenship (such as paying taxes, for example). But there are rights and obligations
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of citizens that do not belong to a visitor, among them the right to vote and obligations such as service in a nation’s military (where applicable). The citizen, then, has
access to benefits of membership in the organization but also is charged with satisfying obligations attending citizen status. The visitor, on the other hand, may receive
some (or all) benefits (even if not all the rights, such as to vote) accruing to a citizen but may be required to perform no duties or at least may be required only to
refrain from breaking rules, laws, or procedures while present in a nation. The visitor may be mistaken by others for a citizen while not, in fact, being one.
A citizen may choose (in most democratic societies) not to participate in all or
some of the most important rights that belong to her as a citizen. The group of citizenvoters, for example, can be and is (in American society, at least) larger than the number of those who actually vote. One can be called “voter” (because one is registered
to vote and has a right to do so) and yet not vote at any particular opportunity to do
so. One may participate only incompletely or not at all in the activities that define a
citizen. A citizen who does not participate in the essential activities that characterize
citizenship may be a full citizen in name but not in fact. On an Aristotelian interpretation, such a citizen is one only “homonomously” in the same way a hand detached
from a body is not properly a hand because it does not perform its appropriate function. Aristotle clarifies this position such that “for example, if the whole body be
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might
speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But
things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are
the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the
same name” (Politics, I, iii). Aristotle is referring to the social or political nature of
human beings such that we need the state and are fulfilled through it. The state or community, in addition, requires fully functioning individuals for the community to
achieve its ends.
The same can be said with respect to the presence of a student in an honors community. Even though a student may satisfy requirements for admission, it is possible
that, after admission, she may not participate in activities characterizing membership
in the honors community. One who does so is an honors student in name only, not in
fact. Complete membership in a community requires, again, not only that a member
be present within the community but that the individual performs actions that are consistent with membership in it. So the voter who casts a vote at an appropriate time and
place, who takes advantage of the opportunity to cast the vote, is more fully engaged
in what it means to be a voter (and a citizen) than one who possesses but does not
exercise the right to vote. Just as we may distinguish between citizen-voters in name
and in act, we can distinguish between members of an honors college (“honors students”) who are and are not participating members, i.e., fully engaged in what it means
to be, what defines, an honors student.
I have made a distinction between an “actively participating member” in a community and a “passive” or incompletely participatory member of a community. This
distinction is reminiscent of John Dewey’s comments regarding the Great Society and
the Great Community. For Dewey, developments in modern technology and means of
information dissemination make possible advances in creating comfortable lives and
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access to myriad types of information for citizens, but in such conditions people may
lose their sense of community – or a common strand of activity leading toward a common goal that defines a community.
For Dewey, the problem … is to locate and declare the conditions that
can enable the transformation of a Great Society into a Great
Community. This in turn is to explain how the mere germ of community can grow into a unified democratic community, where democracy ‘is the idea of community life itself.’ When we find some association or activity ‘whose consequences are appreciated as good by all
singular persons who take part in it’ and where what is good and
shared and promoted by all who produce it, there we have what
Dewey calls a ‘community’. As far as Dewey is concerned, the association of men and women that is necessary to a community does not
require explaining. He says of ‘associated activity,’ very succinctly,
‘things are made that way.’ But on its own this fact does not give us a
community. A true community has an essential moral dimension. That
dimension requires content and character through sharing common
purposes. (Stanlick and Silver, Vol. II, 139)
In short, the creation of community underscores the notion not only that members
share common purposes and perform actions consistent with those purposes but also
that members develop a feeling of common identity and membership. Central to the
creation of community is not whether academic programs and colleges/universities
are themselves complete democratic institutions (although on the Deweyan model that
is the ideal case) but whether education serves the purpose of educating people for
participation in democratic societies in which the development of community is essential. Losing or never having a sense of shared purpose, feeling or acting as though one
is only present in a group but feels no deep connection to it, either because community does not exist or because the individual does not share the commitment that defines
the group (that is, the individual loses or does not have a sense of shared purpose and
as a result feels only present in a group but not connected to it), may, in fact, begin to
explain, in the context of an academic community of any kind, the general breakdown
of respect for and participation in the life of a community where it does or can exist.
The reasons for which human beings associate themselves with others and form
communities are many and varied. Much ink has been spilled in the history of ethics
examining these reasons, and the reasons vary widely. In the individualist, rightsbased tradition, an individual associates herself with others to gain benefits for the self
that would not be achieved as efficiently, or at all, by herself. Jeremy Bentham’s conception of the character of community expresses this point in that the “community is
a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting … its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the
interests of the several members who compose it” (PML, Ch. 1, Sec. 4, p. 12). Here,
community is nothing more than whatever the members of the community have in
common with each other. Further, community in this sense is artificially constructed
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only for the interests of the individual. On the other hand, the virtue-theoretic (or communitarian-oriented) sense of community is quite different in that it encompasses the
notion that “community already exists, in the form of common social practices, cultural traditions and shared social understandings” (Kymlicka, 367) such that it “does
not need to be built de novo, but rather needs to be respected and protected”
(Kymlicka, 367). Further, however, the virtue-theoretic or communitarian approach to
social organization is such that “people form communities to realize something of
value that is achievable in association with others” (Julius Moravscik, qtd in SternGillet, 213). So even when a specific community is formed at some particular time,
the ability to form the community, to give it a name or designation, comes about only
as a result of the association of people with a similar overriding interest, recognizing
that the interest is then a community goal shared by the individuals. This makes it possible, too, that communities continue to exist as relatively stable constructs even when
particular individuals enter and leave the community. In essence, then, in the virtuetheoretic conception of community, individuals associate with others not only for the
advancement of the self but also because human beings are naturally social or political beings who understand their place in a social group as having implications for the
individual’s benefit as well as for that of others.
The problems created by the individual, rights-based conception of social relations in which a sense of real community membership is neither required nor necessarily desired by individuals are captured in Michael Sandel’s explanation that, under
this scheme, there are no particular ends sought by a particular society. Instead, pure
procedural rules replace ends, enabling “citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent
with a similar liberty for all; [the society] therefore must govern by principles that do
not presuppose any particular conception of the good” (Sandel, “Procedural
Republic,” 82). Without a shared conception of the good, however, the “self” or individual has no identity and little or no moral compass because there are no clearly
identifiable institutional roles. So, as apologists for virtue-theoretic or communitarian conceptions of social life contend, it is important to realize that who and what we
are is formed largely by our place(s) in social settings. This realization has accompanied the resurgence of interest in the virtues and their development in the work of
Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and others, related to
claims such as “it takes a village to raise a child” and the like. This realization also
includes, I think, a resurrection of the notion of “honor” as part of a virtue theoretic
sense of our moral lives.
For the modern individualist, we are essentially individuals and not members of
groups or communities, so if the concept of honor requires a stable sense of community, honor becomes obsolete in the modernist account. Berger et al. explain the obsolescence of honor in the modern world such that honor is understood “in a world of
relatively intact, stable institutions, in a world in which individuals can with subjective certainty attach their identities to the institutional roles that society assigns to
them” (93), and since the modern world and its procedural rules for the unencumbered self do not lend themselves to any such identification, “[i]nstitutions cease to
be the ‘home’ of the self; instead they become oppressive realities that distort and
estrange the self’” (93). Another way to put it is that “[t]he concept of honor implies
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that identity is essentially, or at least importantly, linked to institutional roles” (90;
emphasis added).
Here, however, it is easy to see why both the communitarian ideal’s proponents
and detractors point out that one particular danger of such a close link between the
individual and the community is the risk of coercive practices, of forcing conformity
among members of a group. Sandel, however, contends that this is not necessarily
problematic. Sandel describes de Tocqueville’s analysis of American public life as a
“complex mix of persuasion and habituation” that “offers a way of conducting political argument, not transcending it” so that public institutions such as “townships,
schools, [and] religions … form the ‘character of mind’ and ‘habits of the heart’ a
democratic republic requires” (Discontent, 320-321) rather than eliminating differences between people and ideas. Sandel’s conclusion is that “[t]he hope of our time
rests … with those who can summon the conviction and restraint to make sense of our
condition and repair the civic life on which democracy depends” (351). I take this to
mean that the ideal of community life does not require conformity and it does not stifle individuality. Instead, it gives a dynamic quality to the community so that individual excellence may manifest itself in the search for the good for all. That good is
dependent upon the creativity, the critical eye, and the intelligence of people like students in honors programs.
Whether an individual’s goal in gaining entrance into a specific community is
purely self-interested or other-regarding is, however, not my primary interest in this
paper. Regardless of the reason(s) an individual may wish to become part of a community, it is the community itself which is central to morality for building and sustaining the community. Even the self-interested individualist recognizes that becoming a member of a community requires respecting the interests of the community lest
the benefits gained by the individual from the community cease to be received. And
for the individual who understands her placement in a community to include responsibilities to others and to the vision or goal of the community that reaches beyond the
individual’s own interests, it is clear that the community cannot continue to provide
benefits for individuals without taking into account the interests of the community as
a whole. I think it is true both that the creation of and entrance into an honors community are central to the honors experience and that students in honors communities
distinguish themselves as academic and moral exemplars for larger academic and
social/political communities.
For an honors community, “honor” is the shared practice and commitment of the
group, but to understand more clearly the way in which the individual and the community are connected to the notion of honor, and the way in which the interests of the
individual and community may appear to clash but actually do not, it will be useful
to consider the opposite of honor in an academic context. That is, it will be helpful to
consider dishonest or dishonorable persons or practices (such as cheaters and cheating) ultimately to show how individual and community interests are consistent with
each other, why building a community is beneficial to the individual, and how this is
relevant to the meaning of an honor code for an honors college. One ethicist claims
that “honor codes are very effective in keeping individual behavior in conformity with
a group’s standards. Honor codes are often developed with the context of a sense of
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solidarity with the group…. As a result, it is expressed more in those cultures which
value community over the individual” (Liszka, 44). Whitley and Keith-Spiegel note,
however, that:
The nature and feel of the campus community environment – the
campus ethos – is a powerful influence on individual students’ attitudes toward cheating. If students perceive their campus as merely
providing a means to an end, and as unjust, disjointed, laissez-faire,
impersonal, and without a core identity, deterrents to cheating may be
very weak. (147)
They note, too, that “the simple establishment of an honor code is not sufficient to
reduce academic dishonesty; rather, the honor code reflects the presence of a normative climate that frowns on dishonesty” (31). In addition, McCabe and Drinan contend
that “honor codes, in and of themselves, are not the only means to mitigate cheating
at colleges and universities. The success of honor codes appears to be rooted in a campus tradition of mutual trust and respect among students and between faculty members and students.”
It is interesting to note here that Liszka’s position is not that the notion of honor
is used or expressed only in cultures in which the community is valued over the individual but simply that it is expressed more in those contexts. It is not necessary that
the community be valued over the individual for honor to be an important or essential
moral notion closely connected to the role and status of an honors student. Further, it
is not clear that an honor code reduces cheating in some causal way.
Research on the effect of the existence of an honor code on college students with
respect to problems of cheating and plagiarism indicates that there is a significantly
smaller number of self-reported instances of academic dishonesty among honor code
schools than among those with no honor code (see McCabe and Treviño). It is unclear
whether the existence of a code reduces instances of academic dishonesty due to fear
of reprisal for violating it or whether there is a culture of honesty at honor code
schools that might not be as prevalent at other institutions. The question, then, is
whether the difference in instances of occurrence of academic dishonesty is a result of
having an honor code in place or whether those who attend honor code schools already
overwhelmingly embrace the ideals embedded and expressed in a code. To attempt to
answer this question through statistical analysis of empirical data concerning rates of
cheating and plagiarism is not my purpose here. It is, instead, to discuss the moral
notion of what distinguishes adherence to a code and being honorable from simple
compliance with a code and appearing honorable. I am concerned with the moral
import of the reasons that students adhere to a code, not whether they in fact do so. I
will use the University of Central Florida Burnett Honors College honor code as an
example to investigate concepts such as individual and community ascendancy models of our social relations, or the moral and social orientations of students, leading to
a conception of the role of the honors student in building and sustaining an academic
community.
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The University of Central Florida Burnett Honors College honor code consists of
five statements of expectations for members. It reads:
As a member of The Burnett Honors College I pledge to uphold the
following academic and ethical standards:
To strive for the highest levels of performance in all scholarly endeavors and to do so with the enthusiasm that stems from a true love of
learning and a devotion to academic excellence
To demonstrate self-discipline, commitment, and responsibility in fulfilling my obligations as a member of the academic community
To show thoughtfulness, understanding, and empathy toward my
peers, and to offer encouragement as they pursue their academic goals
To be respectful of, and attentive toward those who teach and mentor,
while cherishing the ideal that academic excellence is best served
where scholarly debate flourishes
To honor the traditional rules of conduct that guide the achievements
of a scholar including contempt for plagiarism, cheating, falsification,
or any activity that threatens academic integrity and honesty
Is a list of expectations stated in this honor code – this list of rules – simply a list
of externally imposed expectations such that it is considered negatively as the statement of a community that “build(s) connections around beliefs, and affirming those
beliefs is frequently a part of the price of admission” (Glotzbach, 50)? Or is it a way
of academic, personal, and professional life that the honors student chooses for herself and strives to attain? To answer these questions, consider two competing theoretical views of the way we may conceive of the notion of academic integrity through its
opposite, academic dishonesty. These competing views are roughly similar to the distinction made earlier in this paper between an individualistic approach and a virtuetheoretic model of social relations.
The two competing views I consider here are that of Bernard Gert (see Gert,
1998) and my own (Stanlick, 2005). According to Gert, the goal of education is not
only to do the best one can but to do better than others. Gert uses an analogy to the
game of golf to explain that cheating is wrong because it disadvantages others who are
engaged in the same competition but that cheating does not disadvantage or cheat
spectators, referees or judges, or even the cheater herself.
Gert’s position is roughly analogous to what Kibler et al. describe as the individual ascendancy model of our social and educational relations. It is an orientation of
action and attitude focused on the present, on hedonism, and on duty to oneself (4). It
is further characterized by heavy emphasis on negative rights, the notion of individualism that one has an obligation not to harm others and not to interfere in the exercise
of their rights while pursuing one’s own individual interests. Another way to understand Gert’s position is to consider his claim that the means by which cheating and
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dishonest behavior may be curtailed is to ensure that the cheater realizes that others
engaged in the game will not allow the cheater to gain the benefits of the activity when
cheating has been detected. Or, to put it differently, other players will cease to play
with the cheater once cheating behavior is discovered, and the players will, in short,
expel the cheater from the community of players (if, of course, the cheater is exposed
as such). Paradoxically enough, however, the cheater violates the primary obligations
to self and others in seeking to fulfill his duty to himself (to look out for and pursue
his own interests) by cheating since, by seeking to fulfill his duty to himself, the
cheater harms others on whom he depends for the ability even to begin to play the
game. In this view, then, Gert is wrong because “cheaters do hurt themselves, but they
do not only hurt themselves. They also degrade the education of and affront the
integrity of their honest peers” (Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, viii). Perhaps, then, the
inverse is also true in that the culture of honor and honesty benefits the individual and
her peers, enhancing the education of and respecting the integrity of honest peers. The
paradoxical nature of Gert’s model of social relations shows not only that cheating is
counterproductive to the cheater who is detected but that there is something inherently inconsistent in the individual ascendancy view.
Is individual ascendancy the model for defense of integrity that one should adopt
in or for any community? It appeals largely to censure, to the fear of expulsion, and
hence to the loss of benefits gained by membership in a community. This kind of negative appeal is the problem with individual ascendancy and hence the individualist
model of social relations. When people are members of communities in which the primary duty is to oneself and duties to others simply amount to non-interference in the
exercise of others’ rights and freedoms, communities in which the spirit of activity is
primarily competitive, one is reminded of Sissela Bok’s contention that “the very
stress on individualism, on competition, on achieving material success which so
marks our society also generates intense pressures to cut corners” (Bok, 224) or, in
short, to cheat.
Cutting corners in the academic realm is engaging in dishonest academic practices, but the pressure of fear of censure, coupled with the pressure to succeed and gain
benefits for oneself, may very well lead the cheater to feel compelled to find ways to
cheat undetected rather than to cease cheating. In other words, if Gert is right that education is a competitive activity, the incentive not to cheat is fear of expulsion from a
community; and if the goal of education is not only to do the best that one can but to
do better than others, the cheater may decide that it is best to find more and better
ways to cheat so as not to be caught and thus to continue to receive benefits from participation in the activities of the community.
The problem of academic dishonesty (not simply dishonest behaviors but the
attempt to find more, and more effective, ways to be dishonest) can not to be solved
by means of Gert’s view, especially if the incentive not to cheat is simply fear that one
may not gain benefits from membership. It is ironic, however, that the successful
cheater remains in the community without truly being a member of it. Just as the citizen-voter who lies to other voters about having voted only appears to be a voter but
actually is not one, the student who cheats to retain her position in an honors (or any)
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academic community only for her individual benefit at most appears to be a member
of the community.
Membership in a community requires more than simple presence in that community or the pretense that one has achieved, or that one possesses, qualities or characteristics requisite to the fullest participation in the activity or activities (the life, for the
Deweyan, of the community) that the community makes possible. It requires the performance of actions and the development and possession of character traits consistent
with the individual and community standards that are the primary duties of individuals in communities. The individual who possesses traits of character that are themselves consistent with honor feels “a sense of honor in the emphatic sense that a moral
person is one who does or does not engage in certain types of acts; that an individual’s
identity is bound up with his conduct, which is becoming of certain roles and status,
and that it is beneath one to engage in anything less or contrary to it” (Liszka, 44). In
addition, however, honor is also important to the larger community in that the moral
person of honor is one who holds that “to fail at one’s duties with respect to that role
is to bring dishonor. Whereas duties specify what people are to do for others, given
their role, an honor code has to do more with status within their position or role and
how others should treat them in that regard. In other words, they act honorably
because they have a certain sense of self which others should also have” (Liszka, 44).
To act contrary to one’s status is beneath the honorable person. So the person of honor,
no less than those who honor the honorable, prescribes honorable behavior and character for others as well. The person who has only a pretense to honor or goodness and
who “is a good man only because people will know it, and because they will esteem
him better for it after knowing it, whoever will do well only on condition that his
virtue will come to the knowledge of man, that man is not one from whom we can
derive much service” (Montaigne, “Of Glory,” 472).
The person who conceives of her social relationships as involving obligations (or
better, commitment) to herself for personal excellence as well as an obligation or commitment to the community to promote its excellence has an alternative to the individual ascendancy model and is, I think, more likely to perform academically honest
actions (and thus more likely to promote academic integrity) that are consistent with
the view and characters of other individuals of honor and integrity. It is a virtue-theoretic, community-oriented view of the place and role of the student in the academic
community that Kibler et al. call “community ascendancy” (4). It emphasizes the
interests of the community and the individual such that those who adopt the community ascendancy model are future oriented, accept responsibility, and recognize and
act on their obligations to others. These are people for whom trust and integrity, honesty and honor, are much more important than pretense to individual excellence. The
“community ascender” realizes that benefits for the individual come about only
through the strength of community and that the community gains its strength, its honor
and reputation, from the individuals who comprise it in their having a shared vision of
the goals of the community.
To possess a shared vision, to feel a sense of community, requires respect and
concern for others that may be explained more completely through a discussion of
Aristotle’s conception of virtue friendship. His understanding of friendship may in
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addition serve to underscore the value of community and also the paucity of the individual ascendancy model of human relations.
For Aristotle, virtue (or perfect) friendship, the human relationship that is requisite to the creation of the most morally advanced political communities, can be understood as the model of relationships that community ascendancy recommends. Aristotle
distinguishes between three types or levels of friendship, only one of which is perfect
and suited for the relationships obtaining between individuals who will be able to
forge political communities of virtue. The first and lowest form of friendship is that of
utility. Here, people associate with each other to fulfill some need or desire and the
association dissolves once it has been satisfied. The second form of friendship is that
of pleasure, existing only so long as the people involved in the friendship remain
pleasant to each other. As Aristotle puts it:
Those who love for utility or pleasure, then, are fond of a friend
because of what is good or pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the
beloved is who he is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant. Hence
these friendships as well [as the friends] are coincidental, since the
beloved is loved not insofar as he is who he is, but insofar as he provides some good or pleasure.
And so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved, when the
friends do not remain similar [to what they were]; for if someone is
no longer pleasant or useful, the other stops loving him. (NE, VIII,
iii, 2-3, p. 121)
Pleasure friendships are neither long-lasting nor dependable. They are centered on the
use and pleasure of one who uses others for her own benefit alone. The attitude of the
friend for utility or pleasure is that of the individual ascender who looks solely at the
company of others as a means to achieve her own goals, ending relationships when
utility and pleasure are no longer forthcoming.
It is important to note that the analogy to friendships of utility or pleasure that I
am using here is certainly not perfectly parallel to the case of the cheater or impostor,
but it has affinities to the behavior of the friend of utility or pleasure in conceiving of
friendships (and other social relationships) as means to the ends of individuals without consideration of the interests and ends of others. For the individual ascender,
cheaters and impostors are removed or marginalized from a social setting when their
purely self-interested cheating behaviors are detected, thus ending or curtailing the
relationship. So the cheater who remains undetected, like the friend who does not
cease to find use or pleasure in others, at best has only pretense to membership in a
group and is only incompletely a friend or is a member of a group only insofar as continued benefits are to be obtained.
Even where the duty of the individual is to herself on the individual ascendancy
model, the individual who wishes to obtain individual benefits from the community
must also respect the concerns and interests of others who constitute the community
in which she is present insofar as she must also look out for their interests if she
expects others to look out for hers. To respect the interests of others (consistently with
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Gert’s view) but also to respect the community (that is, to respect the “game” being
played and the other players) requires at least that the individual act in accordance
with community standards. Even this, however, is not enough for full membership in
a community, and it is not enough to claim that the person is one of honor or integrity. To be a person of honor or integrity, a person must be one who can be trusted under
any circumstances “to do the right thing, to play by the rules, to keep commitments”
(Carter, 7).
The community ascender, unlike the individual ascender, realizes that benefits for
the individual come about only through the strength of community and that the community gains its strength, honor, and reputation from the individuals who comprise it.
The community ascender, in addition and most importantly, cares about the community in itself. Turn again to Aristotle’s discussion of friends and friendship, specifically to his conception of perfect friendship, to which the community ascender has significant affinities:
Each of them is both good without qualification and good for his
friend, since good people are both good without qualification and
advantageous for each other. They are pleasant in the same ways too,
since good people are pleasant both without qualification and for each
other. [They are pleasant for each other] because each person finds his
own actions and actions of that kind pleasant, and the actions of good
people are the same or similar.
It is reasonable that this sort of friendship is enduring, since it
embraces in itself all the features that friends must have. For the cause
of every friendship is good or pleasure, either unqualified or for the
lover; and every friendship accords with some similarity. And all the
features we have mentioned are found in this friendship because of
[the nature of] the friends themselves. For they are similar in this way
[i.e., in being good]. (NE, VIII, iii, 6-7, p. 122)
It is this type of friendship, one of mutuality, a perfect friendship in which a friend
sees her friend as another self that serves as the model and foundation of community.
Neither Aristotle nor I contend, however, that a community consisting of hundreds or thousands of members can be characterized by the emotional and intellectual connection that is central to close personal friendships of the sort described here.
Aristotle does, though, use this model of friendship as a transition to his political
thought in which the polis (the city-state), which is a koinonia (community), is composed of people who understand the value and importance of such highly moral relationships with very specific, well-known other individuals. The translation of this sort
of friendship and its application to a larger population is civic friendship. The person
who understands the value and characterization of virtue friendship, who is a friend to
others in this way, is a “normative communitarian” who “sees civic friendship as the
expression of the goods and values shared by fellow citizens who respect and care for
each other” (Stern-Gillett, 161). This member of the community would “understand
that the excellence of the city requires the dedication of all its capable citizens, and he
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would act accordingly” (Stern-Gillett, 167). Aristotle, however, points out that such
people are rare (NE, VIII, iii, 7, p. 123).
Concentrating his attention on Aristotle’s claim that we must, however, honor
truth above our friends, Glotzbach asks, “if academic community is necessary for the
central work of teaching and learning and friendship or something like it is essential
to the creation of genuine academic community, then how can we rationally ‘honor
truth above our friends’?”(52). Glotzbach finds Aristotle’s position paradoxical, and
perhaps it is so to some extent despite Glotzbach’s attempts to find a solution to it. He
contends that the “quick solution” to the paradox is “the realization that the friendship
that should stand at the heart of an academic community needs to be of a managed
sort, one that does not go to the full extreme of solidarity that characterizes the very
deepest friendships” (53), but he adds that “in a deeper sense, to accept membership
in an academic community is to place oneself under the continuing authority of one’s
peers for the evaluation of the products of one’s intellectual or creative labor” (53).
I think that Glotzbach is right that the quick solution is insufficient because it
misses the point of Aristotle’s conception of friendship that a friend of virtue would
“not give in to requests from others to do something base,” so “the possibility of the
obligations of justice” (which is correlative with truth) clashing with “primary [very
personal] relationships is therefore ruled out in Aristotle’s ethics” (Stern-Gillett, 164).
So Glotzbach’s deeper solution, that members of a community are always under the
authority of their peers, means also that members of the community have its members’
and the community’s standards always on hand as a check on non-virtuous (or better,
vicious) behavior. What this means is that the code of the community trumps the
friend but not the friendship in that the code expresses the actions and goals of individuals and community that define the good person. Since the good person is most
fully a friend, any temptation that would compromise goodness in its members could
threaten to compromise the friendship but will not do so as long as the friend does not
develop personal character tending toward such moral mistakes. Thus, preserving the
community and its ideals is preserving the association not simply because the community has ideals but because the ideals express individual and group commitment to
moral excellence, i.e., to the virtues that warrant honor. Aristotle notes that such
friendships (those of virtue) are rare because such people are rare, and he explains that
such people cannot “accept each other or be friends until each appears lovable to the
other and gains the other’s confidence” or trust (NE, VIII, iii, 8, p. 123). And when the
friendship has been formed, it is not easily dissolved because the character of the
friends is not easily shaken. Such friends are people of character; they are people of
honor. It does not mean that they are perfect, but it does mean that they strive to
become the best that they can be.
So, if Aristotle’s account of friendship holds any weight in the conception of
community to be developed in an honors college, students who recognize that simple
presence in an organization is not enough to maintain the status that is awarded to the
honors student will realize that membership in the honors community requires consideration of others and of the community as a whole. One must be worthy of friendship and trustworthy to her peers, not merely gaining friendship and trust of peers
by pretense to community membership and trust but by being a member of the
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community and being trustworthy. It is in social conditions such as these that the goals
of community and hence the goals of the individual may be reached.
It is the goal of the honors community both to present opportunities to the honors student to take full advantage of her abilities and to establish a community of honors that is consistent with those goals. To do that may, again, be explicable on the
Aristotelian model of virtue (perfect) friendship. He contends that “the friendship of
decent people is decent, and increases the more often they meet. And they seem to
become still better from their activities and their mutual correction. For each molds
the other in what they approve of, so that ‘[you will learn] what is noble from noble
people’” (NE, IX, xii, 3, p. 153). In short, the honors community becomes a community by its members becoming moral exemplars to each other, adopting the characteristics they approve in others, developing further those they already possess, and maintaining the code or ideals by which they live as a statement of the beliefs they already
hold and that they recommend to others. They do this for the good of the self and others. This is concord, which Aristotle calls “political friendship” (civic friendship), “for
it is concerned with advantage and with what affects life [as a whole]” (NE, IX, vi, 3,
p. 144). This community concord is, for Aristotle, “the safeguard of the state” and thus
of community in that “concord is the preserve of those who are decent…. Far from
allowing that there can be honor among thieves, Aristotle … appears to claim that concord cannot obtain unless the citizens themselves are morally sound. The base, whose
motivation is generally unsteady, can neither feel concern for the common good nor
cooperate with others in its pursuit” (Stern-Gillett, 152).
Returning to the honors code of the Burnett Honors College as an example of the
commitments of an individual to create and maintain the community, one can see that
the exhortations to strive for high levels of academic performance, to fulfill obligations
as a member of the academic community, to offer encouragement to others in pursuit of
intellectual goals, to cherish academic excellence and debate, and to honor traditional
rules of scholarly conduct are not externally imposed rules set up for honors students
simply to memorize and follow. They are, instead, a statement of commitments already
possessed by those who deserve the designation “honors students.” Honor makes no
sense for the isolated, atomistic individualist because honor and honoring require community. To build an honors community (or any community, academic or otherwise) is to
admit members for whom commitment to academic and personal excellence is a way of
life, not an externally imposed, onerous requirement that one must satisfy in order to
receive benefits from the group. To build and maintain a community, a person must see
herself as a member of it, not simply present in it. For students who are admitted but
who are not already possessed of traits of character, student who are possessed of only
minimal external indicators of honors status, the presence of an honor code and the
behaviors of those who are already committed to it may lead them to adopt the code as
their own, thereby becoming and then being members of the community because they
have chosen to be so. Members of communities who participate most fully in the life of
the community cultivate character and traits of character that are consistent with the
good. They consider an action contrary to what is good to be “something they don’t do”
not because someone has told them so or because there is a list of rules they must follow. They do what is good simply because it is good. The honors academic community
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exists as a place in which education, honestly obtained and cherished, is such that the
community enhances the individual and the individual enhances the community.

CONCLUSION
Communities come into existence and develop in a manner consistent with the
needs, desires, and interests of their members, who share a vision of the good with
each other. A person might adhere to a self-interested model of human behavior and
believe that people associate with others solely for the benefit of themselves, or
instead she might believe that people form communities because it is part of their
nature to do so in their common pursuit and conception of the good; this distinction is
relevant to the way in which a community will exist, but it is not essential to understanding the way in which a sense of community and a sense of membership in a community are created and sustained.
The membership of individuals in a community helps to define the community
while the community serves as a framework in which the individual may enhance her
position as well as define and attain her own goals. Honors colleges and their students
are uniquely situated in the academic realm to exemplify and illuminate the consistency of individual interests and community goods and to use this to build other academic communities. In doing so, they serve as examples of the importance and effectiveness of communities in providing an atmosphere in which the goals of education
overall may be realized.
To create and sustain not only the honors community but also the larger academic community of which an honors college and its students are a part, administrators
might consider implementation of service learning courses as a central function of the
honors college and perhaps of colleges and universities on the whole. As part of education for democratic citizenship, service to the community of which one is a member
is part of the growth and development of the individual as well as the community itself.
Aristotle notes, for example, that “base people … cannot be in concord, except to a
slight degree, just as they can be friends only to a slight degree; for they seek to overreach in benefits [to themselves], and shirk labors and public services. And since each
wishes this for himself, he interrogates and obstructs his neighbor; for when people do
not look out for the common good, it is ruined” (NE, IX, vii, 3, p. 145; emphasis
added). Service-learning courses are consistent with development of civic consciousness in the honorable person who realizes that, to be a person of honor, one must not
simply seek the good for herself but for others as well. White describes Aristotle’s view
that for “an action to deserve honor … it must promote some valuable end, and for the
virtuous to deserve honor, they must aim at the end and not only at honor itself” (White,
261). Further, “in place of competitive ideals based on status that exalt external success, [Aristotle] proposes a cooperative ideal based on self-knowledge and rational
virtue that finds its highest expression in beneficence” (270). In essence, then, to be an
honors student implies a commitment to dignity and honor, but that commitment
expresses itself in care and concern for others, not for the mere trappings of the benefits to be found for oneself through one’s achievements or abilities. As I indicated earlier, Aristotle did not claim that political friendship is the same as personal friendship
(see NE VIII, ix), but personal and political friendships are very similar in that good
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friendship is altruistic and pluralistic (see White, 84) and so are our political relationships. For Aristotle, the similarity of goodness between personal friends is individual
while the similarity of goodness for political relationships is defined through a constitution or laws; in the case to which I am applying this conceptualization of our social
relations, political friendship expressed academically is a shared commitment to educational goals generally. Those goals are defined by the shared commitment to educational attainment, to the acquisition of knowledge, which the honors student and the
honors community are well qualified to promote and exemplify for all.
The honors student is not simply to be honored for academic attainment or for
abiding by rules or ideals; the honors student must, as a full and participating member
of an honors community, internalize and exemplify honor as a way of life that maintains her real status in an honors community. Honors colleges and their students are
uniquely capable of knowing by experience the distinction between individual interests and community ascendancy in the academic realm. They are similarly situated to
embody the best of the insights of both points of view in creating and maintaining academic communities of honor and integrity in which students are persons of personal
and academic excellence who realize that their code of honor is an exhortation to live
the life of community and individual ascendancy. A community of honors students is
a group of people who understand their relationships with each other to be exemplifications of Aristotelian virtue and civic friendship. McCabe and Treviño (2002) put the
case regarding organizational cultures of integrity that “the greatest benefit … may not
be reduced student cheating. Instead, it may be the lifelong benefit of learning the
value of living in a community of trust.” This is not to say that the value of learning
and living in a community of trust can be achieved, maintained and experienced only
by honors students in honors colleges. There are numerous other academics, professionals, industrialists, inventors, and “everyday people” who belong and contribute to
communities of trust. On the other hand, there are students in honors colleges and programs who do not share in the life of the organization and who may feel no obligation, or only very minimal duty, to any community in which they are present. To recognize exceptions is not to minimize the moral and social import of the exhortation
that we may make to honors students to develop traits of character that situate them
specifically for the obligations and benefits that “honor” may bestow upon them. To
be an “honors student” is more than to attain a high level of academic achievement.
An honors student is a moral exemplar in the academic community.
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